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We study socially vs individually optimal life cycle allocations of consumption and health, when
individual health care curbs own mortality but also has a spillover effect on other persons’ survival.
Such spillovers arise, for instance, when health care activity at aggregate level triggers improvements
in treatment through learning-by-doing (positive externality) or a deterioration in the quality of care
through congestion (negative externality). We combine an age-structured optimal control model at
population level with a conventional life cycle model to derive the social and private value of life. We
then examine how individual incentives deviate from social incentives and how they can be aligned by
way of a transfer scheme. The age-patterns of socially and individually optimal health expenditures and
the transfer rate are derived. Numerical analysis illustrates the working of our model.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Starting from the seminalworkbyGrossman (1972), economists
have applied the life cycle model to examine how individuals allo-
cate health care and consumption over their life course and what
this implies for their health status, mortality and ultimately for
longevity (e.g. Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Ehrlich, 2000). A related
line of literature employs life cycle models to assess an individ-
ual’s willingness to pay for survival – the value of life – and how it
evolves over the life course (e.g. Shepard and Zeckhauser, 1984;
Rosen, 1988; Johansson, 2002; Murphy and Topel, 2006). Both
strands of the literature typically take a positive approach, i.e. they
examine the determinants of individual health care choices and
valuations but do not question their efficiency. In most of the
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.models, efficient life cycle choices are guaranteed anyway, as the
individual (i) faces perfect markets, in particular, a perfect annu-
ity market, and (ii) acts as an isolated decision-maker who is not
linked to other individuals (contemporary or future).1 In the real
world, neither of the (implicit) assumptions in (i) and (ii) is likely
to hold. Markets are typically imperfect or evenmissing so that ex-
ternalities may arise. Likewise, individuals are linked to others not
only through altruistic ties but also through externalities. Thus, ef-
ficiency is by no means guaranteed. In this paper, we seek to shed
some light on the implication of intra- and intergenerational ex-
ternalities on the efficiency of the life cycle choices over health
care and consumption as well as on the underlying valuations.
Specifically,we focus on the effects of spill-overs related tomedical
spending.
1.1. Externalities in the provision of health care
Typically, individual mortality not only depends on the
individual’s own consumption of health care but also on the level of
aggregate ‘activity’ within a health care system. One could think of
1 Note, however, a number of important departures from these assumptions: (i)
Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984), Ehrlich (2000) and Johansson (2002) examine the
case inwhich individuals do not have access to an annuitymarket. Davies and Kuhn
(1992) and Philipson and Becker (1998) examinemoral hazard on annuity markets.
(ii) Basu and Meltzer (2005) examine a model in which the individual cares for a
contemporary family member (partner), whereas Birchenall and Soares (2009) and
Kuhn et al. (2010) allow for altruism towards descendants.
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or compromise individual efforts to reducemortality. First,medical
research has identified a positive relationship between volume of
(surgical) activity and the quality of care, frequently measured by
(lower) mortality (for an overview see Phillips and Luft, 1997).
Thus, the effectiveness of individual health care increases in
aggregate activity. Conversely, by contributing towards aggregate
activity an individual also enhances the effectiveness of health care
targeted at others. As long as these benefits are not internalised
in the price of care – and there is no reason to believe they are,
whatever the pricing arrangements – such spillovers constitute a
positive externality.
Second, in as far as the provision of health care contains public
good aspects, such as the provision of medical facilities, hospital
bed capacity or emergency services, higher levels of aggregate
health care spending may translate into a lower mortality risk at
individual level. Similarly, higher aggregate spending levels may
lead to greater scope for medical R&D or other quality enhancing
activities that would not be lucrative in ‘low spending’ health care
systems.2
Third, positive spillovers typically arise in the context of
preventive activities. The most obvious example relates to
vaccination, where individual mortality decreases in the degree to
which the population is vaccinated against an infectious disease
(for an overview see Philipson, 2000). The same applies to
antimicrobial treatment of infectious disease, which is curative
from the individual’s perspective but also prevents further
infections. Other preventive activities that lower both own and
other people’s mortality include the installation of safety devices
such as Anti Lock Breaking in automobiles or fire detectors in
tenement flats.
Finally, we may think of measures related to public health
such as the cleaning of sewerage, proper disposal of household
waste or the reduction of air pollution. Cutler and Miller (2005)
show that in the early 20th century nearly half of the total
mortality reductions in major US cities can be attributed to the
introduction of clean-water technologies, i.e. the filtration and
chlorination of water supplies.3 ‘Pure’ public health measures
constitute a polar case, where mortality reductions are exclusively
due to cumulative expenditure.4 Such a situation is equivalent
to a public goods problem. But even in less extreme cases, the
problemof private underprovision arises as long as a part of private
health expenditure flows towards a public good (i.e. communal
reductions in mortality).5
All of the above examples relate to positive spillovers, where
higher activity translates into lower mortality. However, in a
number of circumstances the converse may be true: aggregate
activity may increase individual mortality. Negative spillovers
could arise from congestion effects or from microbial resistance
against antibiotics. Excessive demand for health care may lead
2 Murphy and Topel (2007), for instance, model an R&D race for a pharmaceutical
innovation and show that the overall probability of innovation increases in the
share of the social value that the winning firm is able to capture. In our model the
prize for innovation would correspond to the winner’s share of aggregate health
expenditure, thus establishing a link between aggregate health expenditure and
individual mortality.
3 Watson (2006) studies the impact of public sanitation interventions in US
Indian Reservations on the childmortality of Native Americans in the US as opposed
to White infants. She finds that they were quite effective in reducing the mortality
gap despite a sizeable externality on the health of neighbouring White children.
4 Easterlin (1999) argues that, indeed, most of the historical reductions in
mortality due to preventive measures, vaccination and antimicrobials are not
attributable to the market for reason of various forms of externalities.
5 An alternative but analogous interpretation is one inwhich health care is a good
with (positive) network externalities.to congestion in the presence of capacity constraints. Hospital
crowding, for instance, is likely to hike up mortality due to
increased infection risks or due to over-stretched clinical staff
lowering the attention afforded to the care of each individual
patient and being more prone to committing medical errors.6,7
Moreover, it is well known that microbes tend to develop
resistance against antimicrobial treatments. The probability that
a resistant microbial strain develops increases in the level
of exposure. Thus, individual use of antibiotics tends to curb
individual mortality but may, in aggregate, lead to an increased
mortality risk due to microbial resistance.8 In the case of negative
spillovers, there is a tendency towards an excessive consumption
of care.
The empirical relevance of all of the above mechanisms has
been well documented (in the literature referenced). While we
are unaware of empirical evidence as to the distortionary effects
of these spillovers on the level and pattern of individual health
expenditure, in the light of their prominence, we would expect
these effects to be of a non-trivial magnitude.9
1.2. Life cycle implications of health-related externalities
The general implications of health-related externalities are
straightforward enough: under- (over-)consumption of health care
in the case of positive (negative) externalities. The life cycle aspects
of the problem, however, are far more intricate. First, a distinct
life cycle pattern of health care spending translates into a distinct
pattern at which externalities are generated. Second, through
its influence on mortality and ultimately on life expectancy the
externality generates an important feedback. This is because
changes in life expectancy have a bearing on the individual’s
aggregate wealth and on the need to spread this wealth over a life
span of changing length. Third, the extent/value of the externality
is endogenous as it depends on the size and age-structure of the
population, the latter being determined by age-specific mortality.
Finally, a transfer policy aimed at internalising the spill-overs
needs to reflect the above properties and, therefore, gives rise to
a particular age-schedule of the transfer.
We analyse these issues by combining two variants of a
life cycle model with endogenous mortality, depending both on
individual health expenditure and on a measure of aggregate
health expenditure:
1. an age structured optimal control model, where a social
planner maximises welfare at population level (i.e. individual
utilities aggregated over time and age groups). This model
determines the socially optimal pattern of consumption and
health expenditure.
6 Black and Pearson (2002) discuss the problems related with a recent bout in
hospital congestion in the UK. Although congestion is predominantly a problem of
public health care systems (see, however, footnote 7), this nevertheless implies the
presence of negative spillovers within the system.
7 Clement et al. (2008) use DEA techniques to identify congestion, i.e. the
production of undesirable outputs (higher risk adjusted mortality for five
conditions) togetherwith desired outputs (treatments). They find for year 2000data
that 67% of US hospitals were experiencing some level of congestion amounting to
an average efficiency loss of 13%.
8 The positive correlation between intensity of antibiotic use and microbial
resistance iswell documented empirically (e.g. Cohen and Tartasky, 1997; Easterlin,
1999). See also Laxminarayan and Brown (2001) for an economic epidemiological
model of optimal drug use in the presence of antibiotic resistance.
9 A number of the externalities discussed (positive and negative) could be
avoided through appropriate supply side policies (e.g. hospital congestion). For the
purpose of this paper we take their absence as given and ask how the demand for
health care could be adjusted to optimal levels.
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2. a ‘conventional’ life cycle model, where an individual max-
imises life time utility without altruistic concerns. This model
determines the individual pattern of consumption and health
expenditure.
Solving and simulating models (1) and (2) and comparing the
respective patterns of consumption and health care we can deduce
conclusions about the inefficiencies in individual behaviour and
for which age-groups they arise due to the externality. We derive
value of life expressions for the two models, a comparison of
which allows to pinpoint the age-specific degree of inefficiency.
Furthermore, we combine the two models in order to derive a
transfer scheme that, if targeted at the individual, restores the first-
best allocation.
To our knowledge, we are the first to integrate externalities
into a life cycle model with endogenous survival.10 As it will
emerge, this is no trivial undertaking if the spillovers extend across
different age-groups (or, indeed, cohorts) at any given point in
time. By their very nature, the analysis and evaluation of such
effects requires a model of the full population such as model (1),
and therefore stretches beyond what could be achieved within
an individual life cycle model alone. The latter allows to analyse
the behaviour of a given cohort along the time path.11 However,
by construction individual life cycle models are not amenable
to an analysis of cross-cohort effects. Our approach provides a
consistent and tractable way of analysing such effects. Technically,
the age-structured control model (1) differs from the life cycle
model (2) in that the control variables – consumption and health
care – and state variables – assets and population size/survival
probability – vary in two dimensions – age and time – instead of a
single dimension age = time.12 The distinction can be illustrated
with reference to the Lexis-diagram in Fig. 1, depicting the life
experience of cohorts in time versus age. The 45° line represents
cohort lines (e.g. a cohort born at t − a is of age a at time t and of
age s at time t − a+ s).
Individual life cycle maximisation follows the cohort line
disregarding other cohorts. The planner, in contrast, maximises
over the whole Lexis-diagram. In the presence of spillovers,
individual mortality develops along the cohort line not only
10 Laxminarayan and Brown (2001) and Philipson andMechoulan (2003) consider
consumption externalities related to (pharmaceutical) products.While both studies
examine the dynamic impact of internalising policies they do not consider a life
cycle framework. Bolin et al. (2002) consider a life cycle setting where both an
employee and an employer invest into the employee’s health, which in turn affects
her productivity. The resulting Nash-equilibrium is plagued by free-riding. Their
set-up differs from ours as (i) life expectancy is fixed and exogenous; (ii) population
structure plays no role; (iii) they do not derive an optimal policy.
11 It is thus fit e.g. to analyse the life cycle effects of missing annuity markets as in
Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) or Ehrlich (2000).
12 Hall and Jones (2007) consider a discrete time formulation of an age-structured
life cyclemodel in order to simulate the development of health care-spending in the
US. However, they donot consider externalities. Neither do they compare individual
and social choices.according to the individual’s health spending h(a, t) alone but also
according to the health spending h(a, t),a ≠ a realised by other
cohorts at each point in time, t . The first best result cannot be
attained by individuals without correcting policy-measures.
Our main results are as follows. Unsurprisingly, the presence
of positive (negative) spillovers implies that individuals spend too
little (much) on health care and consequently consume too much
(little). The divergence between individual and social incentives is
rendered evident in the social as compared to the private value
of health care. Individuals value the purchase of additional health
care according to their private value of life (i.e. the discounted value
of their expected remaining life time). In contrast, the planner
values additional health care by the social value of life plus the
value of the externality (i.e. the total value of mortality changes
for the rest of the society induced by the individual’s current
health expenditure). The social value of an individual’s life diverges
from the private value of life because it incorporates the value of
spillovers generated by the health care the individual consumes
over its remaining life time. This constitutes a generalisation of
the value of life to incorporate externalities.13 We also consider
the age-schedule of health expenditure depending on the relevant,
private or social, value.
We derive the optimal transfer that fully internalises the
spillover and achieves an efficient allocation of consumption
and health care over the life cycle. Expressed as an ad-valorem
subsidy/tax on health expenditure (with the resulting budget
balance being reimbursed in a lump-sum fashion), the optimal
transfer rate amounts to the proportion of the external value
of health spending (current and future induced through the
individual’s survival) relative to its total value (including in
addition the private value of life). We also show how the transfer
varies with age.
Finally, a numerical analysis, based on US data akin to that
used by Hall and Jones (2007), reveals an interesting asymmetry
between positive and negative spillovers. If positive spillovers
remain uncompensated, the inefficient under-spending leads to a
significant reduction in life expectancy. Individual under-spending
implies higher mortality as both too little is spent on individual
survival (a direct effect) and too low a value of spillovers is
generated (an indirect effect). In contrast, the inefficiency in the
presence of negative spillovers leads to far less variation in life
expectancy. On the one hand, over-spending leads to a direct
reduction in individual mortality; on the other hand, it boosts
mortality due to the negative spillovers. The result is a tread-mill
effect, where individual efforts to curb mortality are neutralised,
leading predominantly to a loss of consumption.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
lays out the model. In Section 3, we derive the social optimum and
characterise the social value of life. Individual choice is analysed
in Section 4 where we present the individual optimum and then
establish the transfer scheme that internalises the spillovers and
induces the first-best allocation. In Section 5we present numerical
simulations to support the analytical results. The final section
offers a discussion and outlook for further research.
2. The model
The dynamics of the population is described by theMcKendrick
equation (see Keyfitz and Keyfitz, 1997)
Na + Nt = −µ(a, h(a, t), H¯(t))N(a, t)
N(0, t) = B(t),N(a, 0) = N0(a). (1)
13 Birchenall and Soares (2009) and Kuhn et al. (2010) provide another
generalisation, where the value of progeny is incorporated into the value of life.
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individuals at time t . The left hand side denotes the change of
N(a, t) in an infinitesimal small step of time ∆ along the 45° line
in the Lexis diagram in Fig. 1, i.e. from (a, t) to (a + ∆, t + ∆).
The subindices a and t correspond to partial derivatives, i.e. Na and
Nt denote the partial derivatives of N(a, t) with respect to a and t
respectively. N(a, t) decreases by the age-specific mortality rate
µ(a, h(a, t), H¯(t)), which depends on age a and can be reduced
instantaneously by providing to the individual an age-specific
amount h(a, t) of health care (or other goods serving to curb
mortality). Here, h(a, t) is an age-structured control variable in our
model. Individual mortality also depends on health care spending
at population level, H¯(t).N0(a)describes the initial age distribution
of the population and B(t) equals the exogenous number of
newborns at time t , which allows for a constant, a growing or a
shrinking population.
We assume that the mortality rate µ(a, h(a, t), H¯(t)) is a
strictly concave function in h and H¯ , satisfying an Inada condition
with regard to h. Specifically, we assume
µ(a, ·, 0) ≤ µ˜(a) (∀ a); µ(a, 0, 0) = µ˜(a) (∀ a)
µh(·) < 0, µhh(·) > 0; µh(a, 0, 0) = −∞ (∀ a),
where µ˜(a) is the ‘‘natural’’ mortality rate resulting without
any health care. Mortality cannot be worsened by investing
in own health. We assume that the mortality rate depends
on the aggregate level of health care, as measured by per
capita consumption of health care H¯(t), (averaged across the
full population) at time t .14 The impact of aggregate activity on
mortality, i.e. µH¯(a, h, H¯) := ∂µ(a,h(a,t),H¯(t))∂H¯(t) , is negative in the case
of a positive externality (greater life cycle utility through lower
mortality) and positive in the case of a negative externality (lower
life cycle utility through higher mortality).
We can write per capita health expenditure H¯(t) := H(t)
N˜(t)
, with
H(t) =
∫ ω
0
h(a, t)N(a, t) da
N˜(t) =
∫ ω
0
N(a, t) da (2)
denoting aggregate consumption of health care and total popula-
tion at time t respectively. Here,ω is themaximal age an individual
can reach.15Aggregate health expenditure for age-group a at time
t is given by the sum of individual expenditure, h(a, t)N(a, t) = N(a,t)
0 hi(a, t)di. The impact of individual spending on average
health expenditure is then given by ∂H¯(t)
∂hi(a,t)
= 1
N˜(t)
which tends to
zero for large populations. Thus, individuals rationally anticipate
that they are unable to influence aggregate spending and an exter-
nality arises.
The second control variable is consumption c(a, t). Con-
sumption increases instantaneous utility according to the non-
decreasing and concave function u(c(a, t)), which is assumed to
satisfy the Inada condition limc→0+ uc(c) = +∞. The objective of
the social planner is tomaximise social welfare, defined as the sum
of the instantaneous utilities of all individuals (total utilitarianism)∫ T
0
∫ ω
0
e−ρtu(c(a, t))N(a, t) da dt.
14 Weuse per capita consumption of health care in order to exclude scale effects as
drivers of our results. We should stress, however, that the use of total consumption
of health care as a measure of aggregate activity would not yield qualitatively
different results.
15 If chosen large enough the fixed upper limit to life time ω is no restriction to
the model. In some approaches ω is variable or a decision variable (e.g. Boucekkine
et al., 2004; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). In our model endogenous life expectancy
(below ω) emerges through the age-dependent mortality schedule µ(a, h,H).The parameter ρ denotes the rate of time preference. Note that we
can allow for an infinite planning horizon T = +∞ at this stage.
Finally we assume a budget constraint that is balanced for each
cohort. This is expressed by the introduction of total wealth A(a, t)
held by age-group a at time t and the following dynamics16:
Aa + At = rA(a, t)+ (y(a)− c(a, t)− h(a, t))N(a, t)
A(0, t) = A(ω, t) = 0 ∀ t
A(a, 0) = A0(a), A(a, T ) = AT (a) ∀ a. (3)
Here, r denotes the interest rate, assumed to be exogenous to the
economy, and y(a) denotes an exogenous income accruing to an a-
year old individual. We normalise the price of health care to one
so that h(a, t) denotes both individual consumption of care and
health expenditure. Each cohort is assumed to hold zero assets
at the time of birth and death. By guaranteeing that each cohort
spends precisely its own life time income, the cohort specific
budget constraint allows us to compare steady-state allocations
derived for the social planner with allocations derived for the
individual (see Section 4). We thus rule out differences in total
spending across cohorts which are due to discrepancies between
the rate of time preference and the interest rate. Consider a
situation where budgets are pooled across all cohorts. If ρ >
r , for instance, the social planner would then not only (i) shift
consumption to the beginning of the planning horizon for each
individual cohort, but also (ii) shift consumption from future
cohorts to present cohorts. Intuitively, we would like to account
for shifts in consumption within cohorts (i) but not across cohorts
(ii). Such an allocation rule also bears some intuitive appeal on
equity grounds. Moreover, in the current paper we focus on the
externality in survival. The effects related to such externalities
can be isolated more clearly when there are as few as possible
confounding effects.
The problem for the social planner is then to choose the age-
specific schedule of consumption and health care to maximise
social welfare. Formally, this is represented by the following
dynamic age-structured optimisation problemwith state variables
A(a, t) and N(a, t) and control variables c(a, t) and h(a, t),17
max
c,h
∫ T
0
∫ ω
0
e−ρtu(c(a, t))N(a, t) da dt
s.t. Na + Nt = −µ(a, h(a, t), H¯(t))N(a, t)
N(0, t) = B(t), N(a, 0) = N0(a)
Aa + At = rA(a, t)+ (y(a)− c(a, t)− h(a, t))N(a, t)
A(0, t) = A(ω, t) = 0 ∀ t
A(a, 0) = A0(a), A(a, T ) = AT (a) ∀ a
H(t) =
∫ ω
0
h(a, t)N(a, t) da
N˜(t) =
∫ ω
0
N(a, t) da
with
H¯(t) = H(t)
N˜(t)
.
Both parameters, time t and age a, are finite in our model
since in general no transversality conditions are available for
16 Analogously to the population dynamics, Aa and At correspond to partial
derivatives of A(a, t)with respect to a and t . Thus (3) describes the change of A(a, t)
in an infinitesimal small time step along the 45° line in the Lexis diagram.
17 A similar modelling approach is pursued by Feichtinger et al. (2006) on capital
replacement by firms, by Prskawetz and Veliov (2007) on intertemporal labour
demand and training, and by Saglam and Veliov (2008) on maintenance and
endogenous depreciation.
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However, as discussed earlier this is no restriction to the model.
In the following section we derive and interpret the necessary
optimality conditions of the above age-specific control problem.
3. The social optimum
To obtain necessary optimality conditions we apply the
maximumprinciple for age-structured controlmodels (Feichtinger
et al., 2003). We define the Hamiltonian of the social welfare
problem as follows18:
H = u(c)N − ξNµ(a, h, H¯)N + ξA(rA+ (y− c − h)N)
+ ηHhN + ηN˜N (4)
where we denote the adjoint variables that correspond to the state
variables as follows: ξN(a, t) refers to age-group N(a, t), ξA(a, t)
refers to assets A(a, t), ηH(t) refers to total health expenditure
H(t), and ηN˜(t) refers to total population N(t). A full derivation
of the social optimum can be found in the proof of Proposition 1 in
Appendix A. Here, we restrain ourselves to reporting the necessary
first order conditions with respect to consumption and health
expenditure:
Hc = uc(c)N − ξAN = 0 (5)
Hh = −ξNµh(a, h, H¯)N − ξAN + ηHN = 0. (6)
Combining them we obtain
uc(c) = −ξNµh(a, h, H¯)+ ηH . (7)
Condition (5) governs the distribution of consumption over the
life cycle.19 Condition (7) governs the choice of health expenditure.
The LHS gives the foregone welfare (per capita) in marginal utility
terms if health spending is increased by one unit for each member
of age-group a at time t . As usual, ξN can be interpreted as a shadow
price, indicating the increase of the value function (i.e. social
welfare) for a small (marginal) increase of N(a, t). In other words,
ξN gives the social value in utility terms of an individual, implying
a marginal social benefit of −ξNµh due to life saving. The second
term on the RHS in (7), ηH , represents the value of the externality
generated by a marginal increase in health expenditure, where
ηH > (<)0 for positive (negative) externalities.
We can calculate the value of life as the willingness to pay for
a small reduction of the mortality rate for age a at time t . To our
knowledge this concept was first developed in a formal manner by
Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984) (see also Rosen, 1988; Johansson,
2002) who apply it to an isolated individual decision-maker. In
the presence of cross-cohort spillovers, a distinction needs to be
made between the private and social value of life (PVOL and SVOL
respectively). Denoting by V the value function corresponding to
the planner’s problem, we define the social value of an individual
life as
ψ S(a, t) := ∂V/∂N
∂V/∂A
= ξ
N(a, t)
ξA(a, t)
= ξ
N(a, t)
uc(c(a, t))
. (8)
We can then express the optimality condition in value terms as
follows (a proof is given in Appendix A).
18 From now on we omit a and t if they are not of particular importance.
19 As is readily checked the optimal distribution of consumption implies
uc (c(a,t))
uc (c(a′,t−a+a′)) = ξ
A(a,t)
ξA(a′,t−a+a′) = e−(ρ−r)(a
′−a) , the Euler condition for optimal saving.Proposition 1. Socially optimal health care satisfies
−1
µh(a, h, H¯)
= ψ S(a, t)+Θ(a, t) (9)
Θ(a, t) :=
∫ ω
0
uc(c(a, t))
uc(c(a, t))
ψ S(a, t)N(a, t)
N˜(t)
µH¯(a, h, H¯)
µh(a, h, H¯)
da, (10)
i.e. it equates the effective marginal cost, −1
µh(a,h,H¯)
, of saving the life of
an individual aged a at time t to the SVOL for this individual plus the
value of the externality,Θ(a, t), generated by the provision of care to
an individual at age a and time t.
Before characterising further the SVOL let us turn to the value
of the externality Θ(a, t), which is determined by the following
factors: (i) the weighted sum over age-groups of the SVOL’s for
(a, t) individuals, where the population share N(a,t)
N˜(t)
is used as
weight; (ii) the relative effectiveness of aggregate spending in
reducing the mortality of (a, t) individuals as given by µH¯ (a,h,H¯)
µh(a,h,H¯)
;
and (iii) a conversion factor uc (c(a,t))uc (c(a,t)) .20 Obviously, Θ(a, t) >
(<)0 if and only if µH¯(·) < (>)0, implying that positive
(negative) externalities translate into a positive (negative) value.
The absolute value of an externality is then large if the spillovers
are particularly effective (high |µH¯ (a,h,H¯)
µh(a,h,H¯)
|) for large age groups
(high N(a,t)
N˜(t)
) composed of members with a high SVOL.
The following lemma provides a further characterisation of
SVOL (a proof is given in Appendix B).
Lemma 1. The SVOL
ψ S(a, t) = ψP(a, t)+Ω(a, t)
is composed of the PVOL
ψP(a, t) =
∫ ω
a
v(s, t − a+ s)e−
 s
a [r+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′ds (11)
v(a, t) := u(c(s, t − a+ s))
uc(c(s, t − a+ s))+ (y(s)− c(s, t − a+ s)− h(s, t − a+ s)) (12)
and the discounted social valuation of net contributions towards the
externality over the remaining life course
Ω(a, t) :=
∫ ω
a
e−
 s
a [r+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′
×
 Θ(t − a+ s)ψ S(t − a+ s)+Θ(t − a+ s)
×(h(s, t − a+ s)− H(t − a+ s))
 ds. (13)
The planner’s valuation of an individual life thus comprises
both the PVOL, counting directly towards social welfare, and
the value she attaches to the individual’s future contributions
to the externalities. The PVOL consists of the (discounted) net
private values of a life year as defined in (12) summed over the
individual’s remaining life time. The net private value of a life
year consists of (i) gross consumer surplus u(c(·))uc (c(·)) and (ii) the
individual’s net savings y(·) − c(·) − h(·). The PVOL corresponds
precisely to the measure derived in individual life cycle models
(e.g. Shepard and Zeckhauser, 1984; Rosen, 1988; or Johansson,
2002). In addition, the planner accounts for the individual’s future
20 The conversion factor equals one if consumption is equalised across age-groups.
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individual consumption of health care. The discounted value of
these contributions Ω(a, t), again summed over the individual’s
remaining life time, is thus the second component of the SVOL.
The value of the individual’s remaining contributions to the
externality in (13) increases with the discounted sum over the
remaining life time of the individual’s net spending surplus over
the average, h(s, t− a+ s)−H(t− a+ s), where the relative value
of the externality
Θ
ψ S +Θ , (14)
serves as a weight. Note that the sign of the relative value depends
on the nature of the externality and increases in absolute value
with the strength of the externality µH¯ (
a,h,H¯)
µh(a,h,H¯)
. Thus, the future
contributions imply a social premium, Ω(a, t) > 0, if the
individual is spending in excess (short) of the average in the case
of positive (negative) externalities. Conversely, Ω(a, t) < 0 if
the individual is spending in excess (short) of the average and
externalities are negative (positive).
Finally, substituting into (9) we can describe the socially
optimal choice of health care by the first-order condition
−1
µh(a, h, H¯)
= ψP(a, t)+Ω(a, t)+Θ(a, t). (15)
The planner’s full valuation of health care (set equal to the effective
cost of saving a life −1
µh(·) ) amounts to the sumof the private value of
life, the value of the individual’s future contributions towards the
externality and the current value of the externality, as generated
by current health care spending. In the following section, we will
use this expression to compare the social incentivewith the private
incentive. Before that, we examine the dynamics of the system.
The optimal paths of consumption and health expenditure can
be described as follows. The change in the consumption of a cohort
born at t − a is given by21
ca + ct = uc(c)ucc(c) (ρ − r) (16)
and reflects the usual life cycle distribution of consumption. If the
discount rate, ρ, equals the interest rate, r , the right hand side
(RHS) is zero implying consumption smoothing over the whole life
for each cohort. If ρ > r consumption decreases over the life cycle,
reflecting the impatience of individuals. The opposite applies for
r > ρ.
In Appendix C we derive the change in health expenditure over
time and age as
ha + ht = −µha + µhH¯ H¯t
µhh  
(i)
− µh
µhh

(r + µ)− 1
ψ S

v + η
H
uc(·) (h− H¯)

  
(ii)
+ 1
µhhψ S
ηH
uc(·)

ηHt
ηH
− (ρ − r)

  
(iii)
. (17)
The change in health expenditure can be decomposed into three
effects. (i) describes the change in the marginal effectiveness of
21 The expression is obtained by calculating the directional derivative of (5) and
using (29) from Appendix A.health expenditure due to the individual’s progressing ageµha and
due to changes over time in average spendingµhH¯ H¯t . Recalling that
µhh > 0 (implying decreasing returns to health care spending at
any given age) it follows that health expenditure tends to increase
directly with age as long as the marginal effectiveness of health
spending increases with age µha < 0. Typically, this tends to be
true for ages up to the 60–70swith health expenditure having little
impact onmortality before the onset of life threatening conditions.
For the highest ages health expenditure is likely to become less
effective in combatting mortality so that µha ≥ 0. The impact of
an increase in aggregate expenditure depends on the nature of the
externality. Obviously, if aggregate expenditure raises (lowers) the
effectiveness of individual spending, this should lead to an increase
(depression) of individual expenditure.22
(ii) describes the impact of a change in the SVOL. Indeed, as
we show in Appendix C the expression equals the rate of change
ψSa+ψSt
ψS
. On the one hand, SVOL increases at the effective interest
rate r + µ; on the other hand, it falls as with the passing of a life
year the social value of this year, v + ηHuc (h− H¯), is lost. Note that
the social value of each life year ismade up of the private value v as
defined in (12) and the social value of the individual’s current net
contribution to the externality. The latter amounts to the excess
spending h− H¯ weighted with the relative value of the externality
ηH
uc
= Θ
ψS+Θ as defined in (14).
23 Noting that− µh
µhh
> 0, it follows
that an overall increase (decrease) in SVOL tends to raise (depress)
individual health expenditure over time.
(iii) describes the impact on health expenditure of a change over
time in the relative value of the externality

ηH
uc

a
+

ηH
uc

t
. The
relative value of the externality increases with the rate of change
of the shadow price ηH and changes with consumption over time
and age. Here, an increase in consumption with age, as for ρ < r ,
implies a reduction in the marginal utility of consumption uc , thus
rendering the externality relatively more valuable (as opposed
to consumption). Consider, for instance, 1
µhhψS
ηH
uc (·) > 0 as is
typical for positive externalities. Then, health expenditure tends
to increase with age if the value of the externality increases over
time or if consumption increases with age, as for ρ < r .
4. Individual choice and optimal transfer policy
In this section we derive the individual life cycle choices of
health care and consumption and compare them with the social
optimum. In contrast to the planner’s problem, age and time
are identical from the individual’s perspective. Defining t0 :=
t − a as the year of birth of an individual, we use the notation
c(a) := c(a, t0 + a) = c(a, t) for age-specific consumption,
and analogously for all other age- and time-dependent variables
h, A, µ relating to an individual of age a at time t . In order to
account for the fact that the individual optimises over its life
course (corresponding to the 45° line in the Lexis diagram in Fig. 1)
rather than the whole age-time rectangular (as the planer does)
we use c˙(a) for the individual optimisation instead of ca + ct . The
time dependent level of aggregate health expenditure per capita
is now indexed by t0 + a. All variables and underlying functions
are as defined before. For the moment consider a set-up in which
individual life cycle choices are not subject to a correcting policy.
22 Examples are learning-by-doing, where the effectiveness of individual surgery
increases with aggregate activity; andmicrobial resistance, where the effectiveness
of individual pharmaceutical treatment is reduced. Indeed, one would then expect
individual expenditure to be raised in the former case and to be lowered in the latter.
23 The identity is readily verified from the second equality in (32) in Appendix A.
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individuals can fully annuitise their wealth by trading actuarial
notes at some return r+µ(a, h(a), H¯(t0+a)).We assumehere that
the individual fully anticipates the impact of changes in health care
on the annuity return. While this assumption is clearly stylised, it
allows us to abstract from longevity-related moral hazard (Davies
and Kuhn, 1992; Philipson and Becker, 1998) as a confounding
problem. Hence, individual wealth develops according to
A˙(a) = (r + µ(a, h(a), H¯(t0 + a)))A(a)
+ y(a)− c(a)− h(a) A(0) = 0. (18)
Assuming the absence of planned-for bequests, we obtain A(ω) =
0. The probability of surviving to age a (modelled analogously to
the social planner problem) equals
M(a) := exp

−
∫ a
0
µ(s, h(s), H¯(t0 + s)) ds

.
We can thus express the life cycle problem for an individual born
at t0 as follows
max
c,h
∫ ω
0
e−ρau(c(a))M(a) da
s.t. M˙(a) = −µ(a, h(a), H¯(t0 + a))M(a)
A˙(a) = (r + µ(a, h(a), H¯(t0 + a)))A(a)+ y(a)− c(a)− h(a)
M(0) = 1, A(0) = 0, A(ω) = 0.
We have shown previously that individuals do not expect to
affect health care spending per capita (as averaged across each age-
group) and therefore take H¯(t0 + a) as given at each point in time.
We show in Appendix D that the individual then chooses health
expenditure such that
−1
µh(a, h, H¯)
= ψP(a). (19)
The individual equalises effective marginal expenditure with the
PVOL,ψP(a), as defined in (11). The externality has a bearing on the
effectiveness of individual health care spending and is therefore
prone to shift individual spending patterns. However, individuals
do not take into account the benefit (harm) they bestow on others
in the case of positive (negative) spillovers. A comparison with
(15) shows immediately that individuals fail to take account of
both the value of the individual’s future contributions towards the
externality and the current value of the externality. Thus, they
will under-spend (over-spend) in the case of positive (negative)
externalities.
It is easy to verify that the life cycle patterns of individual
consumption and health expenditure follow as
c˙ = uc(c)
ucc(c)
(ρ − r), (20)
h˙ = −µha + µhH¯
˙¯H
µhh
− µh
µhh

(r + µ)− v
ψP

. (21)
Thus, individual consumption follows the same rule the planner
would choose. However, the values for c are not equal to those
within social optimum. The differences are implied by those arising
with regard to the life cycle allocation of health expenditure.
Comparison with (17) shows that individuals fail to take into
account the fact that health expenditure should (i) decrease in line
with the loss of the current year’s value of the individual’s net
contribution to the externality η
H
uc
(h − H¯) and (ii) change in line
with changes in the value of the externality
˙ ηH
uc

.
In order to attain the first best allocation the social planner can
introduce the following transfer scheme. Let τ(a, t0 + a) denotea (net) subsidy on each unit of private health care spending or,
equivalently, on each unit of private health care consumed. Hence,
for each unit of care the individual only spends an amount of
1− τ(a, t0 + a). In order to balance the budget in expected terms
the government levies a (net) lump-sum tax equal to the amount
τ(a, t0 + a)h∗(a, t0 + a), where h∗(a, t0 + a) corresponds to the
socially optimal level of health expenditure for an individual aged a
at time t . Note that the lump-sum transfer is entirely exogenous to
individual decisionmaking.24 The individual asset dynamics under
the transfer scheme can then be written as follows
A˙(a) = (r + µ(a, h(a), H¯(t0 + a)))A(a)+ y(a)− c(a)− h(a)
+ τ(a, t0 + a)(h(a)− h∗(a, t0 + a)).
From now on we consider the effects of optimal transfers at
population level. Therefore we switch back to the (a, t) notation
used in Sections 2 and 3. From the FOCs of the social welfare
problem (SW) and of the individual choice problem (IC) we then
obtain
1 = −ψ S(a, t)µh(a, h∗(a, t), H¯∗(t))+ η
H(t)
uc(c∗(a, t))
= −[ψ S(a, t)+Θ(a, t)]µh(a, h∗(a, t), H¯∗(t)) (SW)
1 = −ψP(a, t)µh(a, h(a, t), H¯(t))+ τ(a, t), (IC)
respectively. Here, variables superscribed with ‘∗’ correspond
to the socially efficient solution. Combining the two first-order
conditions yields
τ(a, t) = ψP(a, t)µh(a, h(a, t), H¯(t))− [ψ S(a, t)+Θ(a, t)]
×µh(a, h∗(a, t), H¯∗(t)). (22)
If the transfer induces optimal health expenditure for all ages,
then mortality rates and consumption levels correspond to the
socially optimal levels as well. It follows that the PVOL component
of the SVOL and the PVOL within the individual’s problem are
equalised within each age-group. The following is then easily
verified (see Appendix E).
Proposition 2. The transfer
τ ∗(a, t) = 1− ψ
P(a, t)
ψP(a, t)+Ω(a, t)+Θ(a, t) (23)
with Θ(a, t), ψP(a, t) and Ω(a, t) as defined in (10), (11) and
(13), respectively, induces the optimal allocation {h(a, t) =
h∗(a, t), c(a, t) = c∗(a, t)} for all (a, t).
In order to provide some intuition about the transfer, we
observe25
τ ∗(a, t) ≤ 1
τ ∗(a, t) ≥ 0⇐⇒ Θ(a, t)+Ω(a, t) ≥ 0.
Thus, the transfer constitutes a subsidy on health care, with
τ ∗(a, t) ∈ [0, 1], if and only ifΘ(a, t)+Ω(a, t) > 0. Typically, we
would expect this to be the case with positive externalities, where
Θ(a, t) > 0. Indeed, a sufficient condition for a subsidy is then
given by Ω(a, t) ≥ 0, where an individual continues to be a net
24 Here, we assume that the lump-sum transfer is age-specific. Note, however,
that in the presence of a perfect annuity market the individual is indifferent as
to when the lump-sum transfers are paid/received. One could thus equally well
conceive a solution, where the individual pays a constant annual tax (or premium)
τ =
 ω
0 e
−raM(a,t0+a)τ (a,t0+a)h∗(a,t0+a)da ω
0 e
−raM(a,t0+a)da or even a once-and-for-all tax amounting to
τ0 =
 ω
0 e
−raM(a, t0 + a)τ (a, t0 + a)h∗(a, t0 + a)da.
25 Note that ψP (a, t)+Ω(a, t)+Θ(a, t) = −µh(a, t)−1 > 0.
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time. Note, however, that this is not always guaranteed:Ω(a, t) <
0 cannot be ruled out if over their remaining lifetime individuals
spend less on health care than the population average.
In the following, let us focus on the intuitive case, where for
positive externalities, we have τ ∗(a, t) ∈ [0, 1]. Here, the transfer
rate represents the share of the full social value of health care that
is not internalised by the individual. The optimal transfer is then an
increasing function of the current value of the externality,Θ(a, t),
and the value of future contributions towards the externality,
Ω(a, t). If externalities do not play a role, we have µH(a, t) → 0
and, as is readily verified from (10) and (13),Θ(a, t)+Ω(a, t)→ 0.
Obviously, private choice then approaches the social optimum and
τ ∗(a, t)→ 0. In the other polar casemortality can only be reduced
through collective expenditure H¯(t), i.e. we have µh(a, t) → 0.
In this case, Θ(a, t) → ∞ and thus τ ∗(a, t) → 1, implying that
individuals receive health care free of charge at the point of use but
have to pay a lump-sum tax τ ∗(a, t)h∗(a, t) → h∗(a, t). Indeed,
this is precisely the solutionwewould expect under circumstances
where survival is a ‘pure’ public good. The intermediate cases
follow immediately.
IfΘ(a, t)+Ω(a, t) < 0 the transfer constitutes a tax on health
expenditure: τ ∗(a, t) < 0. While this is the plausible outcome
in case of negative externalities, where Θ(a, t) < 0, again this is
not always guaranteed. Individuals for whom health expenditure
lies below the average over their remaining life time are no longer
contributors towards the externality (but rather recipients) and
therefore receive a tax relief, where Ω(a, t) > 0. Again, focusing
on the intuitive case, where τ ∗(a, t) < 0 for Θ(a, t) < 0 it
is worth noting that the resulting tax is, nevertheless, no mirror
image of the subsidy paid in the presence of positive externalities.
In particular, we note that τ ∗(a, t) > −1 if and only if ψP(a, t) >
−2[Θ(a, t)+Ω(a, t)]. Hence, if the negative externality becomes
strong enough, tax rates in excess of−1 cannot be ruled out. In the
limiting case, whereψP(a, t)+Ω(a, t)+Θ(a, t)→ 0 taxation at
(close to) infinite rates effectively excludes the individual from the
consumption of health care.
Note that we can also interpret the transfer scheme in
the context of health insurance: In the presence of positive
externalities individuals pay an annual premium amounting to
τ ∗(a, t)h∗(a, t) and care is then provided subject to a co-payment
equal to 1 − τ ∗(a, t). In reality, of course the design of health
insurance contracts follows the trade-off between equalising
consumption across different health states and containing ex-
post moral hazard, i.e. the excess consumption of health care
free of charge (see e.g. Zweifel et al., 2009). While a model with
uncertain health states (as measured e.g. by stochastic period-
by-period mortality µ(a, ·)) is beyond the scope of this paper, it
can nevertheless be understood intuitively how health insurance
should be designed in the joint presence of uncertainty and
externalities. With positive externalities the policy-maker seeks
to stimulate demand for health care even under certainty and,
therefore, generates some ‘base-line moral hazard’ by setting
τ ∗(a, t) > 0. In the presence of uncertainty additional moral
hazard is then traded-off against insurance, implying that the
transfer be set in excess of τ ∗(a, t). From the perspective of
externalities, this implies an over-internalisation. In contrast, in
the presence of negative externalities the policy-maker seeks to
discourage the consumption of health care even beyond the level
that would be optimal without insurance, implying τ ∗(a, t) < 0
and, thus, a co-payment 1 − τ ∗(a, t) > 1. In the presence of
uncertainty, the insurance motive would require the co-payment
to be reduced, thus implying under-internalisation. Note, however,
that it is not clear a priori whether insurance with a co-payment
below 1 should be provided. Indeed, negative externalitiesmilitate
against the introduction of health insurance.Finally, we consider the age-time profile of the transfer rate.
Noting that in the social optimum (9) we have Θ(a, t) =
ζ (a, t)ψ S(a, t)with
ζ (a, t) := η
H
uc(c)

1− η
H
uc(c)
−1
(24)
we can express the optimal transfer rate as
τ ∗(a, t) = 1− ψ
P(a, t)
[1+ ζ (a, t)]ψ S(a, t)
= 1− ψ
P(a, t)
[1+ ζ (a, t)][ψP(a, t)+Ω(a, t)] . (25)
Hence, the optimal transfer decreases in the weighted ratio of
PVOL to SVOL, where the weight [1 + ζ (a, t)]−1 measures the
direction andmagnitude of the externality. The following can then
be verified (see Appendix F).
τ ∗a + τ ∗t = −(1− τ ∗)
Ω
ψP +Ω
[
ψPa + ψPt
ψP
− Ωa +Ωt
Ω
]
− ψ
P
ψ S
ζ
1+ ζ
ucc(c)
uc(c)
(ca + ct)+ ψ
P
ψ S
ηHt
uc(c)
. (26)
The change of the optimal transfer ratewith age and time is subject
to twomajor drivers. The first term on the RHS captures the impact
on the transfer rate of the change in PVOL as opposed to SVOL for a
givenweight [1+ζ (a, t)]−1. Naturally, an increase of PVOL relative
to SVOL should reflect a decline in the transfer rate. Recalling
that SVOL contains PVOL, ψ S = ψP + Ω , it follows that the
change of PVOL is offset against the change in the net value of
future contributions to the externality,Ω .26 Consider, for instance,
a positive externality and assume thatΩ > 0, reflecting a positive
net contribution in the future. Noting that −(1 − τ ∗) < 0 for
all τ ∗, it follows that the transfer rate is then bound to decrease
as long as the change in PVOL exceeds the change in the net
value of future contributions. Typically, the PVOL declines with
age from a certain age onwards (see e.g. Shepard and Zeckhauser,
1984; Murphy and Topel, 2006). This should trigger an increase
in τ ∗ as long as the value of future contributions increases (or
decreases by less), implying a growing shortfall of individual health
expenditure from the optimal level. In contrast, if the value of
future contributions falls faster than the PVOL, then the transfer
rate should be adjusted downwards. The numerical analysis in
Section 5 provides further illustration of the age-profiles of the
various value measures and the transfer rate for the case of both
positive and negative externalities.
The second and third terms on the RHS of (26) reflect changes
in the weight [1 + ζ (a, t)]−1 as driven by the underlying changes
in the value of the externality η
H
uc (·) . Consider a positive externality,
where ζ (a, t) > 0. By increasing the value of the externality an
increase (decrease) in consumption with age, ca + ct > (<)0,
would then trigger an increase (decrease) in the transfer rate.27
Finally, the transfer increases if the shadow price of the externality
increases over time. This would be the case, for instance, if the
impact of average health expenditure on mortality, µH < 0, was
to increase in magnitude.
26 In Appendix F we verify that ψ
P
a +ψPt
ψP
− ψSa+ψSt
ψS
= Ω
ψP+Ω

ψPa +ψPt
ψP
− Ωa+Ωt
Ω

.
27 Naturally, by (20) we have ca + ct ≥ 0 if and only if ρ ≤ r . Thus, ultimately the
impact of consumption on the transfer rate is driven by the interest rate relative to
the rate of time preference.
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This section illustrates numerically the results derived in
the previous sections. We model mortality according to the
proportional hazard model (see Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1980)
µ(a, h(a, t), H¯(t)) = µ˜(a)φ(a, h(a, t), H¯(t)),
where µ˜(a) denotes the base mortality rate (effective in the
absence of health care) and where φ(a, h(a, t), H¯(t)) describes
the impact of individual and collective health spending. While
there is little evidence to guide our choice of the function
φ(a, h(a, t), H¯(t)), it strikes us as reasonable to assume the
following properties: φh < 0, φhh > 0, φha > 0;φ(a, 0, 0) =
1 (∀ a) and φh(a, 0, 0) = −∞ (∀ a). Specifically, we let
φ(a, h(a, t), H¯(t)) = 1−

h(a, t)
z
a− ω
1− ω ±

H¯(t)
z ′
. (27)
with z ≥ 0 and z ′ ≥ 0. The effectiveness of individual health
care is decreasing over age up to the point where it becomes
entirely ineffective for a = ω. The effect of average expenditure
is unrelated to age. Furthermore, for this specification we assume
that the marginal effects of individual and aggregate expenditure
are unrelated. Finally, note that positive and negative externalities
are assumed to be of equal strength as measured by
φH¯  =
(

z ′H¯(t))−1 for any given level of aggregate expenditure H¯ .
Per period utility is specified as
u(c(a, t)) = b+ c(a, t)
1−σ
1− σ .
Our numerical exercise is based on the following data. To generate
the age-dependent income schedule, y(a), we take from Hall
and Jones (2007) the average US-income for 1995 and apply
to it a generic age-specific productivity schedule from Skirbekk
(2005). The latter is based on productivity estimates constructed
as a weighted average over 6 age-dependent abilities (numerical
ability, managerial ability, clerical perception, finger dexterity,
manual dexterity, experience). Consequently the productivity
profile does not represent the productivity for a particular
profession, but the average over (more or less) all of them. The
maximum life span ω is set equal to 110. US mortality data have
been taken from the Human Mortality Database (0000) for the
years 1990–2000. All our results are calculated for a steady state
with a stable population.
We then select parameter values that correspond loosely to
the numerical analysis in Hall and Jones (2007). Specifically, we
set z = 10 and z ′ = 30 in the health production function (27)
and b = 6 and σ = 1.5 in the period utility function. Further,we set ρ = r = 0.06. While the interest rate reflects a real
return to savings that is also assumed in Hall and Jones (2007),
setting the rate of time preference at the same level helps us to
characterise the effects of the externalities on the age-profiles of
the variables of interest. Specifically, for a constant consumption
level over the life cycle the various age-dependent expressions
relating to the VOL are not blurred by changes in the marginal
utility of consumption over the life course. For this specificationwe
obtain levels of consumption, average health expenditure, a health
share of about 15.7, and a statistical VOL for the age-group 35–39 of
$3 million that are broadly comparable to the values in Hall and
Jones (2007).28
Fig. 2 plots consumption against the income profile (the
bell shaped curve). For ρ = r it is optimal both for the
individual and the social planner to smooth consumption over
all ages. Thus, as is typical for life cycle models with hump-
shaped productivity, individual consumption tends to fall short
of income in the youngest and oldest ages and exceeds it over a
range of intermediate ages. A comparison between individual and
socially optimal consumption reveals that, as expected, individual
consumption is too high (low) in the case of positive (negative)
externalities. Correspondingly, too little (too much) is spent on
health care in the case of positive (negative) spillovers, as is
graphed in Fig. 3. More generally, and for any of the cases, the age-
profile of health expenditure is hump-shaped. Due to very lowbase
mortality, for the individual there is little to be gained from health
care at the youngest ages. While with advancing age the increase
in base mortality renders the purchase of health care more and
more effective, this is eventually offset for the highest ages, where
a falling PVOL and age-related declines in effectiveness lead to a
drop in expenditure.29 This notwithstanding, from a social point of
28 Hall and Jones (2007): table (II) choose a far higher value of flow utility, b =
30.53 (their scenario 3). Their selection of b is aimed at obtaining a VOL for the
age-group 35–39 of $3 million for a model in which income is age-independent. In
our model income is hump-shaped in age and peaks within the age-band 35–39.
Therefore, the VOL tends to be higher due to the human wealth associated with
the remaining flow of above average income. With the VOL also increasing in flow
utility, we can reduce the latter to a lower value b = 6.
29 As a referee has pointed out, a hump-shaped profile of health expenditure
stands in contrast to the observation that inmost countries (including theUS) health
expenditure strictly increases with age. The difference arises as our expenditure
patterns follow the statistical or ex-ante VOL, which typically decreases from some
age onwards (see e.g. the numerical exercises in Shepard and Zeckhauser, 1984;
Murphy and Topel, 2006). As Philipson et al. (2010) argue, however, real health
expenditure is driven by the ex-post VOL once a life threatening condition has
materialised. At this point individuals are typically willing to spend a manifold
of the ex-ante VOL. The bunching of life threatening situations at high ages then
implies the increasing spending pattern. As our analysis is predominantly of a
normative nature and not targeted at a realistic VOL per se but rather how it should
be amended in the presence of externalities, the discrepancy betweenour simulated
expenditure and real-world expenditure is of minor consequence.
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significant spending levels even for the youngest ages in order to
ensure sufficient contributions towards aggregate expenditure.
Fig. 4 compares the total private incentive, i.e. the PVOL ψP ,
in the absence of taxation vs the full social incentive, ψ S + Θ ,
which we will also refer to as full social value of health care.
For our specification both the PVOL and the full social value of
health care fall with advancing age. The under- (over-) spending
on health in the presence of positive (negative) spillovers is
mirrored in the valuations, where PVOL exceeds (falls short of) the
social value of health care in the presence of positive (negative)
spillovers. Noting from Figs. 5 and 6 (left panel) that in the case of
positive externalities the non-private part of the social valuation
Ω + Θ is positive for almost every age, it follows that in thepresence of positive externalities the PVOL component of the SVOL
(given optimal health spending h∗) must fall short of the PVOL in
the presence of suboptimal spending. This reflects the fact that
individual mortality is ‘excessive’ when positive spillovers are not
internalised, leading to a substantive premium in the willingness
to pay for survival. The converse is true in the presence of negative
spillovers.
Fig. 7 plots the net increase of life expectancy at age a that is
attainable if the optimal pattern of health expenditure is induced.
In the presence of positive externalities (the upper graph), for
instance, the life expectancy at age 20 would increase by about 8
months if individuals could be induced to spend optimally. This
stands in contrast to the case of negative externalities, where
socially optimal behaviour leads to a reduction in life expectancy
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case because from a social point of view, it is optimal to spend
close to nothing up to age 40. Note, however, that in contrast to
the case with positive externalities the impact on life expectancy
of an internalisation of negative externalities is small. The reason
is that individual efforts to lower mortality and the externality
are to a large extent neutralising each other. Socially desirable
reductions in health care do not trigger a large increase inmortality
as the negative impact of the externality is diminished in parallel.
In the presence of positive externalities, in contrast, additional
individual efforts combine with positive spillovers to trigger a
sizeable increase in life expectancy.30
The comparatively large impact of differential health spending
on mortality in the presence of positive as opposed to negative
externalities is also evident in the resulting consumption patterns.
Consulting Fig. 3 we see that the extent of over-spending on health
in the case of negative externalities is more pronounced than
the extent of under-spending in the case of positive externalities.
This should translate into a gap between socially and individually
optimal consumption that is larger in the case of negative
externalities. Inspection of 2, however, shows that the gap in
consumption is in fact smaller. Indeed, in the presence of positive
externalities, socially optimal consumption is lower both due to
larger expenditures on health and due to the fact that consumption
needs to be spread across additional life years with low income
(thus forcing lower levels of per-period consumption).31 In the
presence of negative spillovers, the effect through changes in life
expectancy is less pronounced, so that the gap in consumption is
more reflective of excessive individual spending on health care.
Indeed, in the presence of negative spillovers, the individual’s
efforts to curb own mortality are ineffective to large extent and
only lead to lower consumption: a treadmill-effect.
Fig. 5 develops the age-profile of the net value of an individual’s
contributions towards the externality over its remaining life
time. This value is positive (negative) for all but the highest
ages in the case of positive (negative) spillovers. Surprisingly,
perhaps, this implies that although individual spending levels
exceed the population average only for a range of intermediate
life years, in terms of discounted value, the individual tends
30 Note that the asymmetry in the effects of positive as opposed to negative
externalities is, indeed, systematic and not down to our numerical specification
(which would support a symmetric outcome). Symmetry of the effects across the
two type of externalities would require that in the case of negative externalities
both average and individual health expenditure raise mortality. However, this
would not make sense from a modelling point of view.
31 Naturally, this effect would reverse if incomewas to exceed expenditure for the
life years gained.Fig. 7. Difference in life-expectancy.
to be a net contributor towards the externality for all but the
highest life years. The hump-shaped spending pattern implies a
maximum (minimum) value of future contributions in the case
of positive (negative) externalities. As individuals spend less than
the population average within their last few life years, the value
of future contributions turns negative (positive) in the case of
positive (negative) externalities and eventually approaches zero.
However, owing to only a few life years left at this point, the
absolute values are very low. Finally, we note that in comparison
to the PVOL and the current value of the externality, Θ , the value
of future contributions is rather modest for all ages. Thus, what
is predominantly driving the wedge between PVOL and the social
value of health expenditure is the current value of the externality.
The latter is plotted in Fig. 6 and has a more straightforward
shape. Recall that for an optimal expenditure path h∗(a) it must be
true that Θ(a) = ζψ S(a), where for a steady-state with ρ = r ,
the weight ζ , as defined in (24), is a positive (negative) constant
in the presence of positive (negative) externalities. Then, as ψ S(a)
is declining with age, so is the absolute value of Θ(a). What is
striking, however, is that in absolute terms, the current value of
a negative externality is almost three times that of a positive
externality. This is predominantly reflecting higher overall levels
of mortality (even under optimal investment) in the presence
of negative externalities, which in turn lead to a higher SVOL.
Recall from (10) thatΘ(a) includes the aggregated SVOL of all age
groups affected by the externality. Thus, the highermortality under
negative spillovers translates systematically into a higher current
valuation of the externality.
Finally, consider the age-profile of the optimal transfer, as in
Fig. 8. A first inspection shows that, unsurprisingly, the transfer
constitutes a subsidy (tax) in the presence of positive (negative)
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H
uc
) is a constant, it follows
from (26) that the age-profile of the transfer is entirely driven
by changes of the PVOL and the discounted value of future
contributions towards the externality, Ω . In the case of positive
externalities, the decline in the PVOL suggests a tendency towards
an increase in the transfer. Indeed, up to around age 60 this trend is
complemented by the increase in the value of future contributions,
both widening the wedge between private and social incentives.
For higher ages, however, a sharp decline in the value of future
contributions becomes dominant, thus leading to a closing gap in
incentives and, thus, to a reduction in the subsidy. Surprisingly
perhaps, in the case of negative externalities, the decline in the
PVOL actually triggers an increase in the tax. Recall from the first
equality in (25) that the tax should decrease if and only if the PVOL
falls at a rate in excess of the SVOL. From the second equality it
can now be checked that for the case of negative externalities,
whereΩ < 0, a reduction of the PVOL by some amount dψP < 0
implies that dψ
S
ψS
= dψP
ψS
<
dψP
ψP
< 0. Thus, the SVOL declines
at a higher rate than the PVOL, implying an increasing tendency
towards excess spending. The tax should therefore be increased
with age, an effect that is reversed only for ages above the mid
80s, where a strong decline in the (absolute) value of the future
contributions towards the externality now generates a tendency
towards lower taxation.
A further comparison between the transfer under positive and
negative externalities reveals that for negative externalities the
absolute value of the transfer tends to be greater by a little less than
an order of magnitude. This difference reflects two distinguishing
features of the two types of externalities. First, in the presence
of positive externalities the PVOL is complemented by a term
Θ + Ω > 0 to form the full social value of health care. But
then, the PVOL is bound to be smaller than the full social value of
health care (justifying at best subsidisation at rate 1). In contrast,
for negative externalities the social incentive embraces a term
Θ +Ω < 0 offsetting the PVOL, implying that the full social value
of care is necessarily smaller than the PVOL. While in and of itself
this does not imply high rates of taxation, it shows that, to some
extent, the policy-maker needs strong taxes to reverse private
incentives, whereas in the case of positive externalities, even
moderate subsidies complement the private incentive. Second,
as was discussed previously, the current value of the externality
(in absolute terms) |Θ| is significantly higher in the presence of
negative externalities. This reflects the higher levels of mortality
in the presence of negative externalities, translating into a larger
gap between private and social incentives and, therefore, calling
for a stronger policy.6. Conclusions
We provide a framework for assessing the efficiency of the
individual consumption of health care within a continuous-
time life cycle framework assuming that health care curbs own
mortality but also induces a spill over effect on other person’s
survival. To this endwe combine an age-structured optimal control
model at the population level with a conventional life cycle model.
We show analytically how the planner (but not the individual)
incorporates in her decision making the value of the externality.
Referring to the concept of the willingness to pay for a small
reduction of the mortality rate, i.e. the value of life, we compare
the social and private incentive to spend on health care. We show
that the social value of life comprises the private value of life
and, in addition, the individual’s (net) future contribution towards
social welfare through the spillovers from individual consumption
of health care. Adding to the social value of life the current value
of the externality, as generated by current individual health care
spending, results in the full social value of health care, which in
optimum is equalised with the effective cost of life saving. We
derive analytically the age-profiles of consumption (following the
usual pattern) and,more interestingly, of health expenditure.With
regard to the latter we can trace out explicitly how it develops
depending on changes related to the effects of age and aggregate
expenditure on the ‘effectiveness of care’ and to changes in the
underlying valuations.
From a comparison of the individual and social incentive we
derive a transfer scheme that induces the individual to consume
health care at the socially efficient level. The optimal transfer
rate amounts to the proportion of the external value of health
care relative to its full social value (including in addition the
private value of life). We examine analytically the properties of
this transfer, in particular its age dependency, both for the case of
positive and negative externalities. The age-pattern of the transfer
depends, in particular, on the change of the private value of life
relative to the value of future contributions to the externality, as
moderated by the direction of the externality.
We illustrate themain findings of ourmodel through numerical
illustrations based on US data. The nature of the externality turns
out to have distinct consequences for the pattern of mortality. In
the presence of positive spilloversmortality can be reduced sizably
with corresponding increases in life expectancy. However, owing
to their under-spending individuals fail to realise a significant
share of these gains in life expectancy. In contrast, when spillovers
are negative, no substantial reductions in mortality below the
baseline can be attained. Here, the inefficiency of individual
behaviour is manifested in a tread-mill effect, where individuals
over-spend on health carewithout great effect and, thereby, forego
consumption. Finally, we plot age-profiles of the optimal transfer
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as well as of the current and future values of individual health
spending.
Our results indicate that for negative externalities the value
of the transfer tends to be greater as compared to the transfer
under positive externalities reflecting higher overall mortality
and a difficulty to reverse rather than just complement private
incentives. Furthermore, both the subsidy and the tax increase
in absolute value up to an age 80+, only to decline for the
highest age groups. Thus, the transfer peaks at around the age (or
shortly before) with highest medical spending. This age-pattern
may have rather strong policy implications. Suppose the transfer is
implemented as a co-payment to health insurance. In the presence
of positive externalities the co-payment is then reduced with age
up to the ageswith highest spending, a patternwhich shouldmake
this an attractive policy option from the individual’s point of view.
In contrast, negative externalities would require an increase of co-
payments with age with a peak at the ages with highest spending:
clearly a very unappealing option. These arguments should be
understood to be illustrative, not the least because they rely on the
stylised assumption that there is an exclusive presence of either
positive or negative externalities.
More generally, it has been our main objective to provide
a modelling framework to analyse the efficiency of individual
life cycle behaviour, to present the critical elements of such
an analysis and to illustrate the channels of transmission by
which direct period effects and effects through changes in the life
expectancy impact on life cycle choice. In order to facilitate the
representation as much as possible we have therefore adopted a
number of simplifying assumptions regarding the nature of the
externalities. In particular, by assuming that the spillovers flow
through current aggregate health care expenditure we presume
(i) that all age-groups contribute in a symmetric way and, more
importantly, (ii) that there are no cumulative effects of spending,
as would be present in the context of stock externalities. For our
numerical analysis, we impose additional assumptions, namely
that the marginal productivity of individual health expenditure is
unaffected by the externality and that the impact of the externality
on mortality is independent of age. Clearly, these assumptions
are unrealistic and compromise a direct application of our results
to the various examples of real-world externalities that were
discussed in the introduction. Nevertheless, we have identified a
number of important drivers behind the life cycle transmission
of survival-related externalities that generalise to more realistic
settings. While there is apparent scope for drawing up more
realistic models of life cycle externalities, we leave this to future
research.
Finally, our model lends itself to the analysis of other imperfec-
tions in individual behaviour. The cross-cohort spillovers that give
rise to inefficiency are clearly not only present in the health care
sector but also – and perhaps more prominently – in the produc-
tion and/or consumption of goods. Externalities in production arise
with regard to saving towards the accumulation of a (common)
capital stock that affects the productivity of (everyone’s) labour;
andwith regard to health or educational investments that increase
individual productivity but also the productivity of co-workers. Ex-
ternalities with regard to consumption arise for many modes of
unhealthy consumption (see Forster, 2001, for a life cycle-model
of unhealthy consumption without spillovers). Most prominently
this relates to smoking which not only raises individual mortal-
ity but also the mortality of others. Similar arguments apply, how-
ever, to other consumption goods, such as cars, that directly or in-
directly lead to the emission of pollutants. As should have become
evident fromour analysis, such externalitieswill lead to distortions
both through period effects and through effects in overall life ex-
pectancy. We would thus envisage a number of interesting appli-
cations.Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the Hamiltonian in (4). The dynamics of the adjoint
variables satisfy:
ξNa + ξNt = (ρ + µ(a, h, H¯))ξN − u(c)
− ξA(y− c − h)− ηHh− ηN˜ (28)
ξAa + ξAt = (ρ − r)ξA (29)
ηH(t) = −
∫ ω
0
ξNµH¯(a, h, H¯)
N
N˜
da (30)
ηN˜(t) =
∫ ω
0
ξNµH¯(a, h, H¯)
HN
N˜2
da = −ηH(t)H(t) (31)
together with
ξN(ω, t) = 0.
From now on, we assume T < +∞, which further implies
ξN(a, T ) = 0. In order to obtain transversality conditions for ξA,
we have to consider the conditions A(a, 0) = A0(a), A(a, T ) =
AT (a), A(0, t) = 0 and A(ω, t) = 0. For age-specific optimal
control models with initial and end state conditions there are
no transversality conditions. Thus we ignore A(ω, t) = 0 and
A(a, T ) = AT (a) and add the terms −λ
 T
0 e
−rtA(ω, t)2dt and
−λ  ω0 e−rT (A(a, T )−AT (a))2 da to the objective function. Thuswe
obtain ξA(ω, t) = −2λA(ω, t) > 0 and ξA(a, T ) = −2λ(A(a, T )−
AT (a)) as transversality conditions (implying ξA(a, t) > 0 for∀ (a, t)). The necessary first order conditions with respect to the
controls c and h are given by
Hc = uc(c)N − ξAN = 0
Hh = −ξNµh(a, h, H¯)N − ξAN + ηHN = 0
as reported in the text. Combining them, we obtain uc(c) =−ξNµh(a, h, H¯)+ ηH or
−1
µh(a, h, H¯)
= ξ
N(a, t)
uc(c)
− η
H(t)
uc(c(a, t))µh(a, h, H¯)
= ψ S(a, t)+Θ(a, t), (32)
where the second equation follows using the definition of (8)
together with
Θ(a, t) := − η
H(t)
uc(c(a, t))µh(a, h, H¯)
=
∫ ω
0
uc(c(a, t))
uc(c(a, t))
ψ S(a, t)N(a, t)
N˜(t)
µH¯(a, h, H¯)
µh(a, h, H¯)
da.
Here, the second equality follows when inserting from (30) and
using ξN(aˆ, t) = uc(c(aˆ, t))ψ S(aˆ, t).32
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 1
Solving the adjoint equation (28) with themethod of character-
istics we obtain,
ξN(a, t) =
∫ ω
a
e−
 s
a [ρ+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′
×
[
u(c(s, t − a+ s))+ uc(c(s, t − a+ s))
×(y(t − a+ s)− c(t − a+ s)− h(t − a+ s))
]
ds
+
∫ ω
a
e−
 s
a [ρ+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′
∫ ω
0
ξNµH¯(a, h, H¯)N
N˜
da
× (H(t − a+ s)− h(s, t − a+ s))ds
32 Note the change in notation from a toa, where a refers to the age-group for
which the optimality condition holds anda refers to any of the age-groups.
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the definition in (12) and inserting from (30) and (31) we obtain
ξN(a, t) =
∫ ω
a
e−
 s
a [ρ+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′
× uc(c(s, t − a+ s))v(s, t − a+ s)ds
−
∫ ω
a
e−
 s
a [ρ+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′ηH(t − a+ s)
×[H(t − a+ s)− h(s, t − a+ s)]ds.
Employing the definition in (8) we can then write
ψ S(a, t) = ξ
N(a, t)
uc(c(a, t))
=
∫ ω
a
e−
 s
a [ρ+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′
× uc(c(s, t − a+ s))
uc(c(a, t))
v(s, t − a+ s)ds
−
∫ ω
a
e−
 s
a [ρ+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′
× uc(c(s, t − a+ s))
uc(c(a, t))
ηH(t − a+ s)
uc(c(s, t − a+ s))
× (H(t − a+ s)− h(s, t − a+ s))ds.
Noting that the first order condition for c(a, t) as in (5) implies
uc (c(s,t−a+s))
uc (c(a,t))
= ξA(s,t−a+s)
ξA(a,t)
= e(ρ−r)(s−a) and substituting gives
ψ S(a, t) =
∫ ω
a
e−
 s
a [r+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′v(s, t − a+ s)ds
−
∫ ω
a
e−
 s
a [r+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′ η
H(t − a+ s)
uc(c(s, t − a+ s))
× (H(t − a+ s)− h(s, t − a+ s))ds
= ψP(a, t)−
∫ ω
a
e−
 s
a [r+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′
× Θ(s, t − a+ s)
ψ S(s, t − a+ s)+Θ(s, t − a+ s)
× (H(t − a+ s)− h(s, t − a+ s))ds
= ψP(a, t)+Ω(a, t),
where the second equality follows when observing the def-
inition in (11) as well as the relationship η
H (t−a+s)
uc (c(s,t−a+s)) =
Θ(s,t−a+s)
ψS (s,t−a+s)+Θ(s,t−a+s) , following from the second equation in (32).
Appendix C. Derivation of the dynamics of h
From the necessary first order condition expressed in value
terms, i.e. (32), we obtain
− 1 = µh(1+ ζ )ψ S (33)
where
Θ = ζψ S (34)
ζ :=
ηH
uc
1− ηHuc
(35)
are observed. Total differentiation in direction (a, t) yields
ha + ht = − 1
µhh

µha + µhH¯ H¯t
+µh

(ψ Sa + ψ St )
ψ S
+ (ζa + ζt)
1+ ζ

. (36)Usingψ S = ψP+Ω weobtain (ψ Sa+ψ St ) = (ψPa+ψPt )+(Ωa+Ωt).
From (11) and (13) we obtain
ψPa + ψPt = (r + µ)ψP − v
Ωa +Ωt = (r + µ)Ω − η
H
uc
(h− H¯). (37)
Hence,
ψ Sa + ψ St
ψ S
= (r + µ)− 1
ψ S
[
v + η
H
uc
(h− H¯)
]
. (38)
Furthermore,
(ζa + ζt)
1+ ζ = −
1
µhψ S
[
ηH
uc

a
+

ηH
uc

t
]
= − 1
µhψ S
[
ηHt
uc(·) −
ηH
uc(·) (ρ − r)
]
, (39)
where the second equality follows when observing that

ηH
uc

a
+
ηH
uc

t
= ηHtuc (·) − η
H
[uc (·)]2 ucc(ca + ct), inserting from (16) and
cancelling terms. Inserting in (36) we obtain Eq. (17).
Appendix D. The individual optimum
The Hamiltonian of the individual problem reads (again
omitting awhenever it is not of particular importance)
H = u(c)M − λMµ(a, h,H)M
+ λA((r + µ(a, h,H))A+ y− c − h)
where λM and λA denote the adjoint variables of the survival
probability and individual assets respectively. From the necessary
optimality conditions we can derive the following system of
adjoint variables:
λ˙M = (ρ + µ(a, h,H))λM − u(c) (40)
λ˙A = (ρ − r − µ(a, h,H))λA
with the transversality conditions λM(ω) = 0 and λA(ω) =−2λA(ω), since we implement the terminal condition A = 0 in the
same way as in the planner’s problem. Thus both adjoint variables
are always positive. The necessary first order conditions are
Hc = ucM − λA = 0 (41)
Hh = −(λMM − λAA)µh − λA = 0.
Combining them we obtain
ucM = −(λMM − λAA)µh
⇔ uc = −(λM − ucA)µh
⇔ −1
µh(a, h,H)
= λM(a)
uc(c(a))
− A(a).
Integrating out (40) and (18) we can rewrite the last condition as
−1
µh(a, h,H)
= 1
uc(c(a))
∫ ω
a
u(c(s))e−
 s
a [ρ+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′ds
+
∫ ω
a
[y(s)− c(s)− h(s)]e−
 s
a [r+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′ds
=
∫ ω
a
uc(c(s))
uc(c(a))
u(c(s))
uc(c(s))
e−
 s
a [ρ+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′ds
+
∫ ω
a
[y(s)− c(s)− h(s)]e−
 s
a [r+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′ds
=
∫ ω
a
v(s)e−
 s
a [r+µ(s′,h,H¯)]ds′ds = ψP(a).
Here, the third equality follows when observing that (41) implies
uc (c(s))
uc (c(a))
= λA(s)M(a)
λA(a)M(s)
= e(ρ−r)(s−a) and employing definition (12). The
last equality follows by definition (11).
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An optimal transfer induces spending levels h(a, t) = h∗(a, t)
∀(a, t). In turn, this implies H¯(t) = H¯∗(t) and, thus, µh
(a, h(a, t), H¯(t)) = µh(a, h∗(a, t), H¯∗(t)). We can therefore,
rewrite (22) as
τ ∗(a, t) = ψP(a, t)µh(a, h∗(a, t), H¯∗(t))
− [ψ S(a, t)+Θ(a, t)]µh(a, h∗(a, t), H¯∗(a, t))
= [ψP(a, t)− ψ S(a, t)−Θ(a, t)]µh(a, h∗(a, t), H¯∗(t)).
Furthermore, note that h(a, t) = h∗(a, t) and µh(a, h(a, t), H¯(t))
= µh(a, h∗(t), H¯∗(t)) imply c(a, t) = c∗(a, t). Using the defini-
tion ψ S(a, t) = ψP(a, t) + Ω(a, t) together with c(a, t) = c∗
(a, t) and h(a, t) = h∗(a, t) we can then write τ ∗(a, t) = −[Ω
(a, t)+Θ(a, t)]µh(a, h∗(a, t), H¯∗(t)). Substituting from the first-
order condition (15)µh(a, h∗(a, t), H¯∗(t)) = [ψP(a, t)+Ω(a, t)+
Θ(a, t)]−1 and rearrangingwe then obtain the expression reported
in the Proposition.
Appendix F. Derivation of the dynamics of τ
Taking the total derivative of (25) with respect to a and t we
obtain
τ ∗a + τ ∗t = −
ψ S(ψPa + ψPt )− ψP(ψ Sa + ψ St )
(1+ ζ )(ψ S)2 +
ψP(ζa + ζt)
(1+ ζ )2ψ S
= − ψ
P
(1+ ζ )ψ S
[
(ψPa + ψPt )
ψP
− (ψ
S
a + ψ St )
ψ S
]
+ ψ
P(ζa + ζt)
(1+ ζ )2ψ S . (42)
The first term on the RHS can be rewritten as follows
− ψ
P
(1+ ζ )ψ S
[
(ψPa + ψPt )
ψP
− (ψ
S
a + ψ St )
ψ S
]
= −(1− τ ∗)
[
(ψPa + ψPt )
ψP
− (ψ
P
a + ψPt )+ (Ωa +Ωt)
ψP +Ω
]
= −(1− τ ∗)

(ψPa + ψPt )
ψP
− ψ
P
ψP +Ω
(ψPa + ψPt )
ψP
− Ω
ψP +Ω
(Ωa +Ωt)
Ω

= −(1− τ ∗) Ω
ψP +Ω
[
(ψPa + ψPt )
ψP
− (Ωa +Ωt)
Ω
]
. (43)
Using (39) and then (33) and (35) we can rewrite the second term
on the RHS in (42) as
ψP
(1+ ζ )ψ S
(ζa + ζt)
1+ ζ
= − ψ
P
(1+ ζ )ψ S
1
µhψ S

ηH
uc(·)

a
+

ηH
uc(·)

t

= −ψ
P
ψ S
ζ
1+ ζ
ucc(·)
uc(·) (ca + ct)+
ψP
ψ S
ηHt
uc(·) . (44)
Combining (43) and (44) we obtain Eq. (26).References
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